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The recent books by Allison (1972) and Baldridge (1972) and the set
of articles by Pfeffer (1974), Hickson et al. (1974), and Patchen (1974)
suggest that serious sustained consideration is being given to organizations
viewed as political systems. For the purposes of this paper, politics
will refer to the structure and process of the use of authority and power
to effect definitions of goals, directions, and major parameters of the
social system (Wamsley and Zald, 1973, p. 18). This political orienta-
tion takes power, its distribution, dynamics, and control as central
organizational issues. Decision making is seen to take place among
differentially powerful interest groups engaged in strategies and negotiations
within mixed motive contexts. While there are many conceptual,
theoretical, and empirical problems with the development of a political
perspective, it is a start in the development of what Allison (197 1) terms
an alternative conceptual lens.
The premise of this paper is that this kind of conceptual development
is important for organizational analysts. The political perspective can
be seen as a logical deduction of systems thinking that has been resisted
at theoretical and application expense, especially as a wider range of
more complex organizations are considered. The unit of analysis lor this
paper is the organization. Conceptual clarity at this level of analysis is
important since assumptions (usually implicit) of organizational processes
must influence research and application projects at the individual, small
group, intergroup, and extra-organizational levels
. (Argyris, 1972,
makes a sinrular point for clarifying one's assumptions of man.) This
paper will present a view of the theoretical and social issues that have
acted to resist the development of this political approach, as well as
theoretical perspectives that have led to a consideration of this alternative
approach. Then assuming that the political approach has merit, some
implications will be discussed.
Paradignn development: An approach to organizations and conflict
A basic assumption of this paper is that much of the thinking and
research done in and on organizations has been paradigm constrained.

Paradigmatic values and interests have been antithetical to political
developments. More specifically, Kuhn (1970) and AlHson (1971) have
emphasized the influence of paradigms on the development of science.
These broad frameworks provide structure and direction to the progress
of science in that they legitimate clusters of assumptions and categories
that are defined as problematical, give rules for evidence and its
collection, and influence what "good" answers look like. These con-
ceptual lenses then provide investigators with a cognitive map of their
field with rules and regulations for traveling in scientific space.
The study of organizations is not without its dominant paradigmatic
elements (Pugh, 1966; Perrow, 1972). While not as developmentally
mature as in other sciences, there are basic trends , developed during
the 1945-1960 period, that do pervade the literature. Organizations
are typically seen as internally integrated, rationally coordinated,
hierarchical, and goal oriented in nature. Even with systems thinking,
a definition accurately reflecting this dominant view of organizations
can be taken from Schein (1970, p. 9): "An organization is the rational
coordination of the activities of people for the achievement of some
common explicit purpose or goal
,
through the division of labor and
function, and through a hierarchy of authority and responsibility (my
emphases)." The emphasis here is on goal oriented, rational, and
while not stated in Schein's definition, cooperation (Parsons, 1956).
Conflict, disharmony, and the notion of ongoing organizational processes
were not considered important issues. As Kuhn notes (1970), paradigms
are resistant to change, especially when widespread, not only in the
academic community but also in the practitioner comnnunity. In the
behavioral sciences, paradigm stability is strengthened by the effect of
business and government on research and application (Weick, 1969).
Needless to say, the academicians' values of cooperation and harmony,
with business's enaphasis on hierarchy, goals, and production, along
with a lack of openness to studies dealing with conflict or of decision
making processes in situ (eg. , Dalton, 1959), did not support the develop-
ment of a political approach to organizations.
This does not say that there was no attention to conflict during that
paradigm development period. It does say, though, that research on

intergroup conflict (eg., Kornhauser, 19bZ; Sherif, 1952; Deutsch, 1949;
and Whyte, 1951) typically took organizational goals as unproblematic
.
A good example of this is the union-management cooperation reported
by Whyte as human relation skills were increased at the plant such that
the antagonists eventually recognized their commonality of goals. Most
other studies of organization behavior did not take the organization as
the unit of analysis and thereby concentrated on intergroup behavior
independent of organizational processes (e.g., small, short-term
groups) or on dyadic conflict independent of group or organizational
processes (e.g., French and Raven, 1968). With very few exceptions
(e.g. , Blau, 1964; Dalton et al. , 1968), studies that did take the social
system as the unit of analysis did not pursue conflict and its dynamics
beyond the intra-group level without the use of superordinate goals (e.g.
,
Honnans, 1950; Sherif, 195Z; Kornhauser, 1962). (It should be noted
that some Americans, e.^., Dalton, 19!''9; Dalton et al, , 1968; Coser,
1956, and many British, e.g., Sheppard, 1954; Burns, 1961, were not
in this cooperative dominated paradigm.)
Systems analysis: An approach to systems and conflict
Pre I960, most organizational thought and research was internally
oriented. With the 1960's came systems theory and the notion that social
systems could not be viewed in isolation. Organizational input, through-
put, and output processes as they impacted and were effected by the
environment became important research considerations (e.g., Katz
and Kahn, 1966; March and Simon, 1 958; Thompson, 1967). Systems
theory also made the organization itself more complicated than previously
seen. Systems theory emphasized internal differentiation into subsyst(;rns
each with task and hierarchy specialization. This specialization,
resulting in differential cognitions, realities^ and rationalities, can be
seen to generate two basic strains of conflict in organizations which
can be termed vertical and horizontal. Vertical conflict arises from
status, hierarchy, mobility, and career differences (e.g., Dahlrendorf,
1959; Burns and Stalker, 19b5), while horizontal conflict arises from
organizational specialization by task (e.g., Landsberger, 1961; March
and Simon, 1958). Given systems logic, these two strains of conflict

are inherent in organizations. They can be moderated but not eliminated.
Thus the advent of systems analysis was theoretically adverse to the
notion of goal congruence (or even goals at all) and cooperation at the
organizational level of analysis (Georgiou, 1973). However, these
internally oriented implications were not pursued. Instead, the environ-
hnent and its innpact on the organization became a major theoretical
and research area during the 1960's. With the exception of the short-
lived Cyert and March (1963) research, the systems implications were
not brought to bear on intra- organizational behavior.
Inter- organizational analysis (Organization-environment relations)
Stimulated by Katz and Kahn (1966). Thompson (1967), and
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), there has been much empirical work on
organization-environment relations often phrased in political terms.
For instance, given a get of assumptions dealing with uncertainty and
dependency as antithetical to organizations, Thompson (1967) has
developed a set of propositions and organizational strategics for dealing
with reducing technological and environmental dependent e by various
design
,
competitive, and cooperative strategies. The thrust of his
design strategies involve organizational decisions regarding internal
coordination costs and boundary spanning activities. In dealing with
the environment, Thompson (pp. 32-38) hypothesized, and Pfeffer
(1973, 1974) and Hickson et al. ( 1 974) have studied, a number of
alternatives including: competitive strategies of (a) maintaining
environmental alternatives
,
(b) seeking prestige, and (c) seeking
power relative to those they are dependent upon; and cooperative
(collusive) strategies of bargaining, coopting, and coalitions. The
cooperative strategies have been termed negotiated environments. In
this fashion, analysts have recognized the strategic importance of the
task environnaent and have conceptualized and studied this organization-
environment activity, using an inter-organization framework, in i)olitical
terms. Industrial organizations (Pfeffer, 1973; Lawrence and Lorsch,
1967), medical centers (Hagedorn and Dunlop, 1971), universities
(Baldridge, 1971), hospitals (Pfeffer, 1973), and public agencies (Turk,
1973; Warren, 1967) have been studied using this environment oriented

inter-organization analysis. While there is much equivocal and contra-
dictory in this research (see review by Hunt and Osborn, 1974), the point
is that there has been much systematic work being done at the inter-
organization level of analysis. However, organization analysts have to
date stopped short of following their inter-organizational and systems
thinking through. For instance, Thompson (1967) and Child (1972)
recognize the political behavior at the organization level of analysis,
yet both treat the organization itself as a black box controlled by what
they term dominant coalitions or what Hage and Dewar (1973) call the
organizational elite. In short, the internal implications of systems
analysis have yet to be taken seriously
. This has been the case even
with numerous case studies emphasizing the political-conflict nature of
organizations (e.g., Dalton, 1959; Dalton et al. , 1968; Crozier, 1964,
1973; Strauss, 1962;Bucher, 1 970 ; Wildavsky , 1964). Given the per-
vasive paradigmatic values of integration, superordinate goals, and
cooperation at the organization level of analysis, a shift in emphasis
recognizing conflict and bargaining as inherent organizational processes
has made little progress in the organizational literature.
Intra-organizational analysis : Towards a political perspective
The logic for this shift in emphasis is straightforward. Given
the conceptual development of the organization as an open system in
constant commerce with its inultiface ted task environment, the organiza-
tion can itself be subdivided into a number of subsystems which are
mutually interdependent (Katz and Kahn, 1966; Schein, 1970). In general,
the subsystems are not equally powerful. Each subsystem (e.g., pro-
duction, R&D) develops its own set of norms, roles, and values to
justify its required activities and continued growth (Katz and Kahn, pp.
84-109). Further, as Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) point out, each of
these subsystems has its own task environment to cope with. In this way,
the organization can be conceived of as a system with multiple goals and
objectives that involve multiple interactions between differentially power-
ful units internal to the organization (this can be seen as the internal
environment), and interactions between the units and their relevant
external task environments. This conception of the organization as
made up of competing and interdependent subsysteins with status and

power differentially distributed is the basis for the horizontal and
vertical strains of conflict described earlier. These two kinds of
conflict suggest that organizational stability is the exception rather
than the rule. This internal instability is further heightened by changes
in the technology or the task environment of the sub-units. Given this
instability, it follows that "the organization" has meaning only in the
very short run and that a more appropriate concept is what Weick (1969)
calls organizing. This gives explicit recognition to internal and
external processes that continually redefine "the organization."
With the assumptions of subsystem development and dynamic, the
set of assumptions used earlier to describe organizational response to
environmental dependence can be brought to this internal analysis. That
is, sub-units move to decrease their internal dependence through
cooperative, competitive, and structural strategies (e.g., Crozier,
1964; Dalton, 1959; Sapolsky, 1972). In this way organizations can be
seen as patterns of interaction between subgroups as they aim to decrease
intra-organizational dependence within potentially flexible constraints
posed by their task, their task environment, and the organization's
structure. Within an exchange framework, decisions are then made by
the bargaining and dealings of subgroups. Different decisions will be of
differing importance to the various subgroups and will set into motion
internal haggling eventually resulting in wliat Child (1972) and Thonapson
(1967) term strategic decisions. The dominant coalition (i.e., cliques
that evolve to make the decisions) will not in general be the saine over
issue areas, nor is it likely to be stable even over similar issue areas
given environmental instability (e.g., Warwick, mimeo). These kinds
of processes have been discussed by Cyert and March (1963) and Katz
and Kahn (1966). Cyert and March discuss sequential attention to goals
and quasi-resolution of conflict, while Katz and Kahn (1966) see conflict
as regulated through the dynamic of compromise and accommodation.
They write :
. .
oit is much easier for management to meet conflicts
on a day to day basis, making concessions first to one
part of the organization, then to another part, than it
is to attempt the thorough reorganization which abstract
logic might dictate. The alteration of concessions in
response to the mobilization of forces means that
organizations often jolt along and move by jerks and
jumps (p. 95).

Whatever the term, quasi- resolution of conflict or the dynamic of
compromise, the processes that result in the "jerks and jumps" are
the outputs of political processes carried out at the subsystem level
of analysis
.
With this view of organizations, internal organizational relation-
ships cannot be fully described with the paradigmatic values of coopera-
tion, super-ordinate goals, and open communications. Intra-organiza-
tional analyses must be supplemented with a sensitivity to conflict over
values and goals as well as over scarce resources. The conflict does
not go on unchecked
; it is regulated and constrained by task, structural,
and environmental constraints in a process characterized by bargaining,
negotiation, and other strategies found in mixed motive situations (see
Goffman, 1969). In short, a political perspective is needed to understand
internal as well as external organizational activities
.
Suramary and Review
Over the past 20 years the study of behavior at the organizational
level of analysis has gone from an internal-cooperative oriented phase to
an externally dominated systems oriented view. The paper has argued
from systenns theory and environnnental logic as well as from a utility
point of view that effort should be given to bring the systems-process
oriented perspective inside the organization. Indeed, the political
perspective argues that the direct source of organizational variability,
both structurally and behaviorally , comes from processes and coalitions
internal to the organization. This view does not deemphasize the effect
of the environmient or technology, but rather brings these variables to the
levels where they actually come into play. If this internal perspective
has merit, then it is necessary to go beyond the dominant paradigmatic
values and assumptions and to begin to explicitly investigate what goes on
inside organizations.
If one is interested in the underlying organizational processes as the
primary source of organizational behavior, and if the distribution of
scarce internal resources involve power, authority, and differential
decision making, then organizations are indeed political systems (Dahl,
1970; Sapolsky, 1972). One marvels at how long this perspective has

been ignored. The political perspective emphasizes the interdependence
of organized systems with power, bargaining, compromise, and conflict
over organizational goals, values, and strategies as inherent and thereby
important processes (Perrow, 1972; Cyert and March, 1963; Allison, 1971;
Baldridge, 1971). With this analysis, the analyst must focus on how
decisions, at all organizational levels, get made; for it is the pattern of
internal decisions, deals, and bargains that eventually move the organiza-
tion.
With this political perspective comes its own conceptual lens and
perceptual filters. Conflict is inherent in the system whose social
structure is seen as pluralistic, fractured by subgroups with their
divergent interests. With this perspective, decision making is seen as
one characterized by bargaining and negotiation as the interest groups
with their parochial priorities and perceptions vie for organizational
control. In all, organizations are seen as mixed motive games with
organizational behavior as a political resultant: political in the sense
that the activity from which decisions emerge is characterized by
compromise, accommodation, and bargaining among individuals and
groups with diverse interests and unequal influence; resultant in the sense
that what happens is not necessarily chosen as a solution to a proljlcm,
but may rather result from compromise, collusion, and confusion (e.g.,
Baldridge, 1 97 1 ; Allison, 1971).
So What
From the process oriented approach described above, it follows
that if organizations are differentiated and/or if the organization's task
environment is differentiated and not stable, then a potentially fruitful
way of conceptualizing the organization is as a political system. If so,
then conflict, compromise, negotiation, bargaining, and other behaviors
characteristic of mixed motive situations are important organizational
processes to be understood. Since only an orientation to the problem has
been presented here , strict definitions of political, power, and conflict
have not been needed. If this perspective is found to l)e useful, then the
problem of specifying operational definitions and a theoretical frainework
becomes very important. The further development of this approach and.

more importantly, its utility, await further work. Assume, however,
that this political perspective does have merit; what difference does it
make? If the political perspective is different from other organizational
frameworks, then it should lead to different emphases, concepts,
explanations, and predictions. It should make a difference in the
theoretical-empirical arena as well as in application areas. This final
section will be divided into theoretical and application oriented areas,
and assuming the political perspective's utility, will speculate on some
implications of the approach.
Theoretical implications
The emphasis of the political perspective is on organization level
processes that arise fronn inter-unit behavior. However, much of the
intra-organizational research has not been attuned to these emergent
processes. Much of the social psychological research has not been
process oriented above the sub-unit level (Silverman, 1971), or has
concentrated on the study of small, short-term lab groups, or has
studied individuals or small groups independent of organization level
processes
,
If organizing is taken as patterns of interactions (of whatever unit)
that reoccur over time, then the political perspective calls for more
process oriented research at the organizational level of analysis. This
process perspective requires greater emphasis on politically sensitive
case studies (e.g., Allison, 1971), studies focusing on the patterns and
processes of selected subsystems over time (e.g., Baldridge, 1971;
Tushman, 1974), or on more variable oriented organizational research
that captures more of the emergent organizational level processes (e.g.,
careers, growth, influence). Leadership, for instance, should be
considered differently from its current micro orientation (e.g., Fiedler,
Vroom). Selznick's (1957) institutional leadership, Katz and Kahn's (19b6)
higher level leadership processes, and Hollander and Julian's (1969)
influence-leadership perspective became more appropriate leadership
perspectives. Nemeth's (1972) critique of and suggestions for the prisoners
dilemma research, Chertkoff's (1973) process model of bargaining, and
Burnams' (1973) suggestions for coalition research are appropriate
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directions for content areas important to a political perspective.
This political orientation ought to take advantage of as many-
perspectives on the process as possible. An obvious source of ideas,
both theoretically and empirically, can be taken from political science.
While political scientists have been typically interested in affairs of
nations, normative theory, and relations of governments to their people
(Kaufman, 1965; Dahl, 1970), a few have indicated interest in "private
governments" and political behavior inside organizations (e.g., Wildavsky,
1964; Lindblom and Braybrooke, 1963; Long, 1966; March, 1962; Lakoff,
1972). This interest has been especially active in recent years as some
political scientists have found utility in integrating political analysis with
organizational theory (e.g.
,
Downs, 1967; Zald, 1 970; Allison, 1971;
Wamsley and Zald, 1973). Easton's (1965) work on a process oriented
systems model of political behavior is particularly appropriate given the
perspective presented here.
Of particular importance to a political model is the analysis of power,
power relationships, and power structures. These concerns are very
primitively developed even in political science (Frey, 1973; March, 1966;
Verba, mimeo). While there have been descriptive studies of power
and political dynamics, the power literature has been atheoretical,
internally inconsistent, and contradictory (March, 1966). The most
basic definitional and operational issues remain to be resolved (e.g.
,
Patchen, 1974). Since the operationalization of concepts is interdependent
with theory development, the importance of developing micro-political
theory is of immediate importance for the development of a more explicit
political perspective on organizations.
With respect to theory, the political perspective highlights the
importance of a range of areas that are currently on the periphery of
organization studies. It further directs organizational research to be
sensitive to organization level emergent processes. Methodologically
it forces the analyst interested in organizational behavior to take a more
macro approach to the variables studied and to be open to a wide range
of methods to capture the behavior under study.
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Applications implications
In the applications arena the political perspective offers a counter-
point to the more typical organizational framework. The political appraoc}
puts conditions on the cooperative paradigm which apply to industrial
organizations and even more so to public and non-profit organizations.
As organizations become more internally complex and as the rate of
change of technical and economic environments increases, the internal
dynamics of organizations become more important to understand; the
importance or this political framework is thereby heightened. To conclude
this paper a number of application areas will be discussed with the political
perspective in mind.
Organization development
With the political perspective the usefullnoss of organization
development (OD) is much more problematic and liinitctl than js typically
admitted. OD has developed with a set of as sutnptions and v.iluea of men
and organizations that must be modified if the political pers|)ecliv(' lias
merit. While Friedlander and Brown (1974) define OD in broad terms,
this paper will take OD as the area of concern that has grown from NTL
and related developments over the past 20 years (see Hornstein et al.
,
1971). Much of the work of OD has been centered on individual or small
group nnethods as the primary lever of change (Friedlander and Brown,
1974). For example, Blake and Mouton (1964), Argyris (1962, 1972,
1973), and Beckhard (1969) focus on organizational change through
individual and group methods. This individual directed approach does
not in general fit with the more structurally oriented political approach.
If the process tnodel holds, organizations are always in a state of flux
quite independent of change agents. With the major exception of lop levels
in the organization (if there are any), organizing, as previously described,
runs mostly independently of the individuals involved. That is, organiza- '
tional dynamics result from inter-unit and environmental pressures.
An example of the individual- small group approach can be taken
from Argyris' work. Argyris (1973) emphasizes competence, usually
learned in the lab, as the major lever for planned change. Yet the very
stability of what he terms World A even after individual interventions

12
(e.g.
,
Harrison, 1962) can be traced to a lack of awareness of basic
structural and political processes which the values and perspectives
of laboratory training actually encourage. This kind of effect, where
organizational processes are ignored to the detriment of the change
effort, is graphically illustrated in Warwick's (197Z) discussion of the
state department case (Argyris, 1967). At the organization level, a
more effective approach to change may be a sequencing of individual,
structural, and strategic actions after systematic diagnosis of the clients
task environments. This does not say that lab training is irrelevant, but
does de-emphasize its blanket utility for organization level change. A
more effective training program, particularly for high level individuals,
could focus on economic, financial, and strategic training and less
solely on interpersonal competence.
It follows from the political perspective and subsystem dynannics
that assumptions of individual trust, openness, and commitmt'nl, wliile
possibly appropriate at the within-group level, are very inappropriate at
the organization level of analysis. If so, then many traditional OD
methods become questionable. For instance, where team building may
well be effective within a sub-unit, these new skills and the values
associated with the skills may be quite counterproductive at the organiza-
tional level where the various subsystems vie for scarce resources given
their frequently divergent interests. Again, with the political perspective,
organizational equilibriunn is a function or power and influence differentials
with overall organizational effectiveness as one of many competing system
goals. The case study of Lewicki and Alderfer (1973) dealing with an
abortive union- m.anageme nt intervention graphically described union-
management posturing for their own ends, their basic goal differences,
and the implications of a lack of a political sensitivity of the change
agents. It is assumed
here that if the change agents were able to understand the union-
management processes they would have used a different set of inter-
ventions. In a similar vein, what happens when the change agent cannol
work from the top as most OD theorists suggest (e.g. , Beckhard, 1969)?
What if there is no organizational summit and the organization is instead
ruled by a committee or board of conflicting interests? The OD literature
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is equivocal here. The case reported by Rubin et al. (1973) documents
the difficulties and consequences of extending the conventional wisdom
to medical centers where deans quite frequently have very little real
power (e.g. , Hagedorn and Dunlop, 1971). The political perspective
provides an alternative fromework for conceptualizing, diagnosing,
and then making the strategic decisions for maximum leverage.
Much recent work on OD emphasizes the' importance of viewing
the organization as a system (e.g. , Beckhard, 1969, Schein, 1970, Beer
and Huse, 1972). While this is exactly what is argued for here, a systems
perspective that ignores the political implications of systeins logic is
severely limited. Indeed, the Beer and Huse ( 1 97,^) and Beckhard ( 1 969)
articles are good examples of the conceptual blinders that come from the
traditional way of viewing organizations. They both see organizations as
"open systems" that wait to be systematically manipulated. However, in
these open systems internal processes operating to resist OD interventions
are either ignored or discussed only within the superordinatc goal frame-
work. It is perhaps because of these kinds of blinders that the results of
of OD technology have been equivocal (see Bowers, 1973; Strauss, 197Z;
Back, 197Z). Indeed, Bowers observes that sinnple feedback of data was
more effective than all other OD techniques in his longitudinal study of
organization change. Similarly, King (1974) has demonslrat ed that the
results of an OD program were due not to the intervention itself, but
rather to the high expectations of the individuals involved. The wide-
spread use and enthusiasm for OD techniques in the face of only equivocal
external evaluation speak for the influence of OD values and beliefs and
what King (1974) has called expectation effects.
The political perspective takes the notions of interpersonal
competence, organizational trust, and openness as inappropriate basics
for organizational change. Given a political perspective, of particular
importance is a systematic diagnosis of the clients' place in the organiza-
tional system, his relationships with the task environment (both internal
and external) and previous organizational precedent (or histcjry). With
systematic diagnosis^ strategic decisions incorporating some combination
of structural and behavioral levers can be inade (F ricdlandc-r and Brown,
1974, Tushman, 1974). The particulars of what Friedlander and Brown
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(p. 3Z2) tertn multifaceted O. D. remain for future research. The
political perspective contributes most to the diagnosis phase of the
intervention. While training may be important, it is more likely to
concentrate on bargaining and managerial strategic decision .making
skills and less solely on interpersonal con:ipetence . Traditional OD may
well be successful in many industrial or otherwise simple situations
(e.g., small organization, stable environment, simple tasks), yet if
the political perspective has merit, then the generalizability of OD to
other kinds of organizations will be limited unless broadened to include
the implications of organizations as both political and complex systems.
M.I.S. and organizational decision making
Very tnuch related to organizational change is the work being
done on the design and implennentation of management information
systems (M.I.S.). Indeed, the introduction of an M.I.S. can be seen
as a special case of organizational change. As Downs (1967), Crozier
(1964), and llickson et al. (1974) note, information and the control of
organizational uncertainty are important variables influencing political
processes. If this is so, then the implications for openness and better,
more open, communication become unclear at the organizational level.
This effect has been well documented by Wilensky (1967) and Baldridge
(1971). Further, if informiation is a sensitive political variable and if
groups work to maxinnize their control or influence on information flow,
then M.I.S. interventions become difficult propositions. Sapolsky (1972)
has studied the introduction and use of a M.I.S. is the Navy. The newly
developed PERT system was used by the special projects office not for
its content, but as a powerful political tool in the rapid development of
the Polaris system. Stabell (1974) has shown that the introduction of an
M.I.S. in the financial departtnent of a bank was seen not for its task
usefulness but as a way of being monitored by other nnanagers. It was
therefore not used as intended. Given the sensitivity of information, the
resistance and misuse of M.I.S. follows naturally. The political
perspective highlights the importance of the diagnosis of the political
implications of information and information monitoring before introduction
and even design of M.I.S.
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Related to the M.I.S. discussion is the area of organizational
decision making. If decision making is divided into operational (i.e.
,
linear programming), managerial (internally oriented), and strategic
(externally oriented) decision making (Bowman, 1974), then the political
approach has particular use for the latter two categories. Strategic
decision making from the political perspective looks at goals for the
organization as defined by a dominant coalition (as opposed to goals of
the organization). The problem then shifts to the development of these
dominant coalitions over different issue areas. With the approach
developed here, dominant coalitions and strategic decisions can be
seen as proxies for the output of more basic activities occurring inside
the organization. It is to these processes that the political approach
focuses on. While economic, financial, legal, and technical considerations
impose constraints on these strategic decisions, the decisions themselves
are the result of intergroup bargaining and individual predispositions at
the dominant coalition level. If follows that these goals are not necessarily
the traditional goals of profit nnaximization. Evidence in support of this
approach to strategic decision making is overwhelming. No studies have
supported what Lindbloom (1963) has termed synoptic (i.e., rational)
decision making. Indeed, Lindbloom and Braybrooke (1963) and
Wildavsky (1964) argue that synoptic decision nnaking is impossible in
all but the most simple decisions. Stagner (1969), Hage and Dewar
(1973), Mintzberg (1973), Baldridge (1971), and Allison (1971) have all
reported either case or empirical studies that give direct support to this
political approach to strategic decision nnaking.
Managerial decision making can be seen as analogous to strategic
decision inaking (indeed, the distinction between the two is hazy). Here
too the evidence for internal organizational decisions also strongly supports
the political viewpoint. Examples include Wildavsky's (1964) study of
budgetary decisions, Baldridge's (1971) description of decision making
atN.Y.U., Bucher's (1970) description of medical schools, and Hicks on
et al.'s (1974) study of decision nnaking in industrial organizations. The
examples cited above dealing with M.I.S. also fit here.
Implications of this view of organizational decision making are
many. For instance, organization-wide decision systems at the managerial
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level are probably less appropriate (in terms of intended vs. actual
use) than individual or small group tailored decision systems. This
view is congruent with Hall's (1972) observation of the lack of use of
managernent decision systems and would support a Meador-Ness (1974)
type of tailored approach. In terms of long-range planning, the political
approach em.phasizes the importance of establishing, protecting, and
expanding what Bowman (1974) terms an organizational niche through
tracking and acting on the organization's technical and economic environ-
ment. Similarly, units within the organization can be expected to increase
their power by establishing contingent dependencies with other sub-units
in the organization (Hickson et al. , 1974). The training of managers in
terms of ways of thinking about organizational behavior in strategic
tertns is also appropriate given this political approach.
Organization design
Organization structure and design has received considerable
attention given its direct applications potential. Evidence strongly
suggests that economic and technical environments impose constraints
on organizational structure (at least if performance is an issue). While
these constraints were taken as quite severe (e.g. , Lawrence and Lorsch,
1967), recent evidence suggest that these constraints are broad. Pugh
(1974) and Reinman (1973) suggest that organizations can perform
equally well (at least in the short run) in a given environment with a
number of different organizational structures. This non-deterministic
view of organization and structure fits well with the political approach.
If the environments pose constraints then structural decisions become
another set of important strategic decisions (Child, 1972). A good
example of this kind of strategic decision making is Chandler's (1962)
history of the decentralization decisions in a number of large American
firms and their consequences in terms of long run criteria.
In the more explicitly design area the political approach raises
questions similar to those raised in the O.D. discussion. The design
suggestions (e.g. , Galbraith, 1974) often lack a sensitivity to their
political consequences. For exatnple, if the political approach has
merit, then Lawrence and Lorsch's (1967) ideas on confrontation as
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the most effective strategy for reducing conflict becomes strained. If
the conflict is between two differentiated areas, then the probability of
the managers openly exchanging accurate information and open feelings
in the process of conflict resolution is small, A nnutual orientation
requires a binding superordinate goal. Further, the integrator in a
political system becomes more of an arbitrator or mediator between
groups. The characteristics of an effective neutral may not be those
described by Lawrence and Lorsch (pp. 54-74). The same kind of
argument can be made for the potential lack of applicability of Likert's
(1961) linking pin concept. Finally, Galbreith's (1974) discussion of
matrix organizations does not speak to the potential problems of subgroup
stereotyping and intergroup processes except in terms of the integrator.
Reward and pay system
At a different level than structure and design is the issue of pay
as a nnotivational device. Lawler (1971) has done much work in this
area and serves as a good exannple of how his assunnptions of organiza-
tions affect not only his application suggestions but even his motiva-
tional nnodel. Take the issue of pay secrecy vs. pay openness. Lawler
summarized n^cuh of the literature on pay and its relationships to
organizational effectiveness. His thrust is that pay should be tied to
perforn-iance and that organizations should try to match their pay system
to their structure. A particular observation made by Lawler, on the
basis of einpirical work and his normative orientation, is that pay secrecy
is detrimental to organizational effectiveness. He writes: "the organiza-
tions could then nnove to complete pay openness, but only when it has, as
a whole, becotne more democratic with high levels of trust between
supervisors, subordinates, and peers (p. 257)." Frotn the political
perspective there are two problenns here. Organizations, as constrained
systems, are not typically "demoncratic with high levels. . .of trust. . . . "
This is certainly true on an organizational level. There is a more critical
difference, however, in the conception of pay and its use. Lawler sees
pay as the organizational reward to employees. 11 public, then all could
see the relationship between pay and performance. This open policy of
rewarding the successful and punishing (i.e. , withholding) the less
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successful would then decrease invidious and inaccurate comparisons
and serve asa motivating organizational system. The political
perspective sees pay not only as a reward to individuals, but just as
inaportantly , as a tool for management. Pay can be conceived of as
a tool used to couple the individual or group to management values or
directives (Gruenfeld, 1972), Bonuses given selectively are an integral
tack of the managerial subsystem to tie significant others to their line
(Tausky, 1970, pp. 83-86). To make pay public would destroy this
bargaining tool. (While this is not recommended, it nevertheless is
real.)
Part of the problem which results in his sometimes misleading
propositions is Lawler's view of organizational processes. Mis
motivational model is also part of the problem. Given his psychological
orientation, organizational processes such as career decisions, local
rationality, and the like, do not enter into the model. As such, its
organization level generalizability is limited. (Graen's 1969 extension
of this motivation model is appropriate given the importance of organiza-
tional level decisions.) Very mcuh related to the pay issue are the areas
of promotion and assessment. The political perspective makes these
decisions, especially at the post-hire level, much less rational and
programmable than reported by MacKinnon (1974). Since many goals
are operating simultaneously at the different sub-units, decisions of
promotion and assessment can be seen as political decisions with varying
criteria applied by the different areas for the different levels. Burns
and Stalker (1966), Dalton (1959), and Pfeffer (1973) all discuss promotion
and assessment in political termis.
Leadership
The last topic to be discussed here is leadership. Given the
political orientation and the organization level perspective, leadership
can be viewed as concerned with the adjudication of interests and with
strategic decisions more than with the traditional concerns of initiation,
consideration, or motivation. This macro approach has been discussed
by Selznick (1949). His institutional leader is not an operational manager
i s
but rather.viewed as a politician, a political broker, distributing status
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and influence to further what he (or the dominant coalition) sees as the
organization's mission. This view is very similar to Katz and Kahn's
(1966) origination and interpolation of structure leadership types.
Leadership at these levels has not been studied except in case studies
(e.g.
,
Baldridge, 1 97 1 ; Allison, 1971). Given the process-political
orientation, alternative leadership frameworks could be generated from
Hollander and Julian's (1969) influence perspective or from Blau's
(1964) exchange perspective. Like the pay and motivation literature,
much of the leadership literature does not generalize to the organizational
level of analysis either because the level studied is individual or intra-
group (e.g., the participation literature) or it ignores organizational
level processes (e.g., Fiedler, 1967). For example, in Vroom and
Yetten's (1974) normative leadership model;issues of careers, competi-
tion between groups, differential perception, and other political kinds of
processes are not considered. These considerations could well alter
their decision paths. This does not say that their model is not useful,
only that it could be more complete with the addition of these kinds of
variables. An example of a more complete model is Graen's (1969)
work on motivation which explicitly takes organizational issues into
account.
Finally, the political perspective can be seen as an integrative
framework for the diverse work done on the stimiulation of creative
leadership or organizational innovation. If the innovation is more than
a routine change, and if the implementation of the innovation involves
the marshalling of resources and decision support, then the usefulness
of the political approach is clear. Studies by Hage and Dewar (1973)
and Normiann (1971) in industrial organizations and Davis (1967) in the
Navy, as well as the theoretical article by Wilson (1966), support the
utility of this political approach to innovation. The notion of product
champion as described by Davis (1967) and Achilladelis et al. (1971) can
be seen as good examples of the utility of political skills in recognizing
and pushing innovation in the face of organizational inertia and resistance.
The obvious implication is that creative leadership skills should include
political skills for dealing with internal and external units.

.>0
Conclusion
The political perspective presented here is an attempt to begin
to develop an organization level framework that is consistent with
systenns thinking and the work on organization-environment relations.
The development of this view has been presented in an historical-
developmental sequence which recognizes that the dynannics of conflict
and power should be brought into organizational level analyses. The
implications of this kind of framework are many; some have been
discussed here. This viewpoint is not meant to replace but rather
compliment current conceptions of organizational behavior. Indeed
the elaboration of this framework can be seen to be an integrating
device for the now isolated, it not divergent, psychological (e.g. , pay,
motivation) and sociological (e.g., structure, environment) perspectives
on organizations. The need for an explicit framework is great, especially
as analysts becotne involved in a wide range of organizations where
traditional conceptions and methods do not work well (e.g. , Rubin ct al. ,
1973). The explicit framework remains to be developed, both conceptually
and empirically. With all the difficulties involved, it is the argument
of this paper that the shift will be well worth the effort since it will bring
organization studies nmore in line with organizational reality--a benefit
both to those interested in thinking about and those working with
organizations
.
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